the start. 6 The modification of the structure of the banks can be linked to the evolution of their tasks. Initially often set up to functioning as commercial entities they would eventually be charged with the issuing of currency and take on lender of last resort functions. Central banks became responsible for the conduct of monetary policy, albeit initially often subject to direct government supervision.
The principal role of central banks in the conduct of economic policy of a country also explains to some extent the trend towards nationalization of these institutions that can be observed namely in the first half of the twentieth century. However, a considerable number of central banks, including most prominently the Banks of the Federal Reserve System remain shareholder-owned. 7 The legal bases of central banks reflected this function essentially by defining and delimiting the exercise of authority in line with what can be observed for other institutions that exercise public power. The definition of monetary policy objectives and the institutional structure of the bank, including the relationship with government, became central features of central bank legal bases. As the sole issuers of currency, certainly from the second half of the last century central banks also had a role to play beyond the national sphere mainly through foreign exchange rate operations and the participation in different international organizations and fore, such as the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements and, more recently, the G-8 and G-20 summits.
When reflecting on the changing role of central banks in the global economy three interconnected developments can be observed, including globalization, regionalization and the global financial crisis. The hypothesis at the outset is that these developments which are to a considerable extent beyond the sphere of influence of any one central bank or indeed national government can have a decisive impact on the (constitutional) legal position of central banks and their foremost task, as it is currently understood, that is the conduct of monetary policy. This contribution offers a panoramic view of selected issues linked to the institutional position and main monetary policy task(s) of central banks and thus does not aim at an all inclusive legal and/or economic analysis of all tasks that are or odd to be associated with central banking.
Globalization
In the context of economic developments globalization may refer to ". . . the processes involved with the emergence of a global economy characterized not only by the opening of markets and the rapid expansion of trade, but moreover 6 Such as the Reichsbank, the forerunner of the German Bundesbank. also of the removal of financial market restrictions and free capital flow on a global scale." 8 Capital flow takes on namely the shape of Foreign Direct Investment leading ". . . to an internationalisation of production processes and new ways of doing business as companies have established affiliates abroad both to gain access to foreign markets and to reduce input costs." 9 Central banks face several challenges. Firstly, there is an increased pressure to bring national laws and practices relating to macro-economic governance in line with internationally recognised standards and best practice. Moreover the regional pooling of monetary policy tasks has resulted in a reformulation of the missions of central banks.
Towards Global Standards and Practices
Ohler has pointed out rightly that "From a legal point of view, the existence of internationally open markets is surprising insofar as there exist no relevant treaty rules under international law imposing a general obligation on states to guarantee free movement of capital", pointing furthermore out that states ". . . unilaterally opened their capital markets, mainly to attract direct investments but also in order to benefit from other forms of international capital movements."
10 Along equal lines it may be argued that there is no international legal obligation to introduce particular institutional arrangements with regard to monetary policy. Nevertheless a remarkable synchronization of law and practice can be witnessed with regard to monetary policy. Somewhat pointed central banks can be characterised as being independent and single minded.
The reason for this partially spontaneous harmonization is that capital can move virtually free of restrictions and, given today's technological advances, can be relocated almost instantly. Failing to bring law and practice on macro-economic governance in line with internationally recognised standards and best practice can result in a loss of confidence of globally acting markets in the financial environment of a country at the detriment in the medium-term also of the real economy. Global competition arguably reveals systemic weaknesses also in the legal sphere. It may thus not be surprising that in parallel to the globalization of financial markets also the main contours of monetary policy and the institutions that are charged with its conduct have become less distinct. In fact, a clear monetary policy objective geared towards the combating of inflation has become the dominant feature of central banks. On the institutional side, central bank independence and accountability have become two almost globally recognised standards of central bank governance and indeed prerequisite for the credibility of a countries' monetary policy. 11 The existence of this peer pressure to fall in line is verified by the fact that countries lacking a credible monetary policy choose to unilaterally link their currency to that of a country or region with a central bank system featuring such characteristics.
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The benefits resulting from a managed or fixed exchange rate regime (currency pegging) are thought to outweigh the costs of losing monetary policy as an (ineffective) tool of economic policy. 13 Facilitating this process of de jure synchronization, central bank governance issues, ranging from the legal foundations and accountability to operational issues, are regularly discussed in international fora, such as the Central Bank Governance Forum, 14 
Central Banks as Guardians of Price Stability
Generally speaking economic policy may be divided into fiscal policy and monetary policy. The latter is generally vested in the central bank of a country which regulates the money supply, as well as the availability (liquidity) and cost of money 18 (interest rates) namely through open market operations (mainly refinancing operations), standing facilities (overnight lending and deposit facilities) and minimum reserve requirements for financial institutions.
19
In pursuing monetary policy central banks are bound by the objectives which their legal bases set. Such objectives may in principle refer to a whole range of developments including inflation, employment and economic growth. A trend can be observed towards the establishment of a singular monetary objective geared towards price stability. With regard to the latter, the insights into what monetary policy can and more importantly cannot achieve has developed towards the mainstream conviction that the long-term impact of monetary policy on the real economy and namely growth and employment is limited (the so-called neutrality of money), 20 whereas at the same time a low rate of inflation forms the basis for and has a favourable effect on real growth and employment.
21 This is reflected in many modern central bank legal bases which identify price stability as the primary monetary policy objective. This is not to say however that price stability is in all instances the only or indeed primary monetary objective with which central banks are entrusted. While there has been a clear trend towards giving priority to the combat of inflation, 22 some central bank legal bases still include multiple objectives. In the case of the European Central Bank (ECB), Art. 127(1) TFEU clearly states that the primary objective of the Bank is to maintain price stability. While the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is also supposed to support the general economic policies in the Union, this is limited by the fact that such activities may not compromise the primary objective of the ECB. In cases where legal bases do introduce multiple objectives in practice some central banks nevertheless orient their monetary policy towards price stability. The Norges Bank, the central bank of Norway may serve as an example in this regard. Monetary policy is supposed to be geared towards the 18 A broad concept of money is referred to here which does not only include banknotes and coins but also other means of payment, see Mitlid/Vesterlund, Steering interest rates in monetary policyhow does it work, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review (2001) As to the quantification of the monetary policy objective of central banks and thus the degree to which and by whom the primary task of the central bank is demarcated, different arrangements can be observed. Regularly the legal basis of a central bank will not define the monetary objective namely through a quantification of the price stability criterion. Highlighting this point, neither the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB nor the Federal Reserve Act include any details in this regard. 25 At the same time, the degree to which central banks are free in defining price stability varies. Some legal bases foresee in a procedure for the establishment of policy targets unilaterally by government, such as in the case at the Bank of England, 26 or by means of an agreement between government and the central bank, such as for example at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 27 In other instances, most notably the ECB and the FED, it is effectively left to the central bank itself to quantify the monetary policy objective(s). Leaving aside the question whether from the point of view of accountability a central bank should indeed be in charge of setting its own goal(s), 28 there is a notable consistency in the approach by central banks to the setting of inflation targets. 29 Thus for example the ECB aims at keeping an inflation rate of below, but close to 2% over the medium term, the most recent inflation target of the Bank of England is set at 2%, the Norge Bank targets a consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5% over time, and the latest Policy Target Agreement applicable to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand sets an inflation rate between 1% and 3% on average over the medium term. Despite multiply and non-hierarchical monetary policy objectives even FED officials in the past signalled towards a rate in the region of 3%.
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Central Bank Independence and Accountability Similar to the price stability objective, central bank independence has become an important pillar of central bank governance that has found its way in many central bank legal bases and thus characterises many central bank systems. Based on insights from political economy in the last decades there has been a remarkable trend towards the removal of monetary policy from the political business cycle by positioning central banks outside the trias politica.
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This trend is closely linked to the attainable aims of monetary policy described in the previous section. Indeed, it has been observed that there is a link between the institutional structure of a central bank and namely its degree of independence and the extent to which it can pursue monetary policy effectively, as ". . . an independent central bank can give full priority to low levels of inflation, whereas in countries with a more dependent central bank other considerations (notably reelection perspectives of politicians and a low level of unemployment) may interfere with the objective of price stability. A monetary policy directed towards low levels of inflation is considered to be more credible. This in return will enhance the effectiveness of the policy conducted by the central bank. Indeed, ample evidence has been provided in economic writing for a negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation and inflation variability.
33 Similar arguments are also applied to financial regulatory and supervisory authorities, as the distance of the latter from government and elected politicians is considered a precondition for the effective conduct of its task, namely banking supervision. 34 These insights have translated into the character of the legal bases of central banks which define the position of the monetary policy authority outside government namely by establishing own legal personality, the freedom to pursue statutorily prescribed objectives and to apply the available instruments more or less insulated from government or parliamentary interventions and by establish the financing of the central bank through own resources. 35 Moreover, this also includes the exclusion or limitation of central bank credit to government.
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While in most instances central bank legal bases have the status of an ordinary law (act of parliament), in the case of the European System of Central Banks this feature has been elevated to a quasi-constitutional status, as the TFEU ensures the independence not only of the European Central Bank (ECB), but also of the participating national central banks in the conduct of the tasks assigned to them in the ESCB. 37 Vesting monetary policy and thus, an important part of economic policy outside government and with it the constitutional system of checks and balances applicable thereto has raised concerns about the accountability of central banks for the tasks that have been assigned to them, and namely the pursue of the monetary policy objectives. 38 Indeed, a central bank that continuously pursues a monetary policy which lacks broad political support but also the support of the public at large is likely to be overridden sooner or later. 39 Conversely, a broad public support can help to shield a central bank from political pressure. Art. 130-131 TFEU and the Protocol on the ESCB and of the ECB annexed to EU Treaty and TFEU; see also Art. 88 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which makes the transfer of monetary policy competences subject to the existence of a ECB that is independent and moreover geared towards maintaining price stability. counterweight to the independent position of central banks, in the last two decades drafters of central bank legislation have become more alert to introduce channels through which the central bank is answerable for its conduct. In general, mechanisms providing those charged with judging the performance of the bank with the necessary means to make an informed assessment and tools to penalize central bank behaviour can be differentiated. In judging the performance of a central bank first and foremost its primary monetary policy objective must be defined as precisely as possible. The trend described in the previous section to identify price stability as an overriding objective in many central bank laws has facilitated the accountability of central banks. At the same time considerable differences exist with regard to the extent to which and by whom the objective is actually quantified. Central bank legal bases regularly impose specific information obligation and thus, transparency requirements. The purpose of these requirements at least in practice is twofold, as they may not only serve the accountability, but also the credibility of the central bank. 40 At the same time, central bank laws and namely those that provide for a large degree of independence often do not include elaborate provisions linked to penalizing central bank action. This is hardly surprising given the potential trade-off between independence and arrangements such as overriding mechanism allowing for monetary policy decisions to be (temporarily) set aside and the possibility for a performance-based dismissal of central bank officials. To be sure this is not to say that there is no room for such arrangements, as the example of internationally recognized central bank systems, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England, highlight. form of regional integration, not least because it also stands for an advanced, albeit far from optimal, system of macroeconomic coordination and monetary policy integration.
Other Inter alia in the shape of exchange rate risks and a lack of price transparency in the internal market. crisis and the collapse of the first and until the present day only global exchange rate system under the Bretton-Woods Agreement, the so-called Gold Standard, 49 leaving the Member States without any effective coordination of their exchange rates until the establishment of the European Monetary System.
The provisions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) introduced by 1993 Treaty on European Union highlight how the role of national central banks can change in the process of the pooling of competencies for monetary policy in a single institutional framework and the replacement of the national currencies by a single common currency. It would be an oversimplification to describe this process as one of centralization of monetary policy. Instead an institutional system has been put in place which, as far as its decision-making structure is concerned, shares some characteristics of federal central bank systems, such as the German Bundesbank and the FED. 50 While monetary policy decisions are no longer taken at the national central banks, their governors -for the time being -all participate in the decisionmaking in the Governing Council, the decision-making body of the ECB. 51 Due to this involvement of the national central bank governors in the decision-making of the independent ECB, primary Union law extends the independence requirement also to the national central banks of the Member States. Resulting from this, in the run-up to EMU, several central bank laws of the Member States where amended to bring them in line with the provisions of the then EC Treaty (now TFEU) and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB.
As a consequence of the pooling of competences in the area of monetary policy the central banks of the euro area Member States were effectively stripped of their primary task and -at least in some instances -also their dominant position in the national system of economic governance. 52 In seeking new areas of activities, not least in order to limit cuts -central banks have taken on new or expanded on existing tasks not linked to those exercised in the framework of the ESCB. In particular with regard to financial markets and namely financial institutions central banks can be seen to fulfil prudential supervisory tasks either on their own or jointly with other national agencies. It is a well-known fact that namely the Bundesbank-system has been a major source of inspiration for the drafters of the legal framework governing the ESCB and the ECB. What is more, the establishment of a European regional currency unit has become a model for initiatives in the same direction elsewhere. Thus for example the participating countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have announced plans to launch a single currency.
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Global Challenges to Central Banking
In the economic and monetary sphere fiscal and monetary policy authorities find themselves faced with developments which are not only outside their sphere of influence, but at times also difficult to anticipate. While the global financial crisis may be considered the prime example in this regard, the same also holds true under normal conditions in the global economy.
The Globalization of Monetary Policy
The challenges which central banks face in the light of globalization and also regionalization are not only of an institutional nature, but also concern the monetary policy tasks they perform. More concrete, central banks are faced with economic developments outside their sphere of influence. It has been highlighted that globalization increases uncertainty for monetary policy and evidence has been provided to the effect that central banks have become less effective in influencing national liquidity conditions. 54 Whether and to what extent central banks should pursue a monetary policy that is more geared towards taking into account possible spill-over effects as a result of global financial markets is arguably not primarily a legal question in the sense that this does not require an adjustment of the legal basis of a central bank, but rather of the monetary policy strategy pursued by the central bank. Given their independent position, this is primarily for the central bank itself to decide upon. linked to this globalization of inflation. 55 On the one hand, globalization is considered to have had a positive effect on inflation in industrial countries by inducing downward pressure on prices inter alia through the opening of labour markets, better allocation of (financial) resources and increased competition. 56 However, highlighting the complexity of the effects of the processes involved, globalization may also induce upward pressure on prices as demand namely for energy and raw materials in emerging economies has grown notably. Whether and to what extent a positive correlation between globalization and inflation exists in the long-run remains subject of debates. Summarizing the scepticism raised against the globalization-of-inflation argument Ball argues: "In my view, there is little reason to think that globalization has influenced inflation significantly. "Modest" and "limited" probably overstate the effects." 57 Trichet has observed that "Whatever the influences being exerted in the context of globalisation, the basic principle which allows the anchoring of monetary policy remains: in the long run, inflation is a monetary phenomenon. As a consequence, globalisation does not affect the central role and overriding responsibility of central banks to preserve price stability" 58 However, even if this is true, it should not be mistaken for an argument that globalization cannot have an impact on the policy stands of a central bank. While in the absence of exchange rate arrangements central banks continue to decide themselves on the rate of inflation of their currency, 59 in determining their approach to monetary policy and thus their strategy monetary policy authorities do need to take into account the "global factors [that] drive inflation" and thus the external factors that put pressure on prices. 60 What is more, the aftermath of the global financial crisis highlights that external and In fulfilling their tasks in a globalized economy the margin of error for central banks are smaller than has previously been the case. Much more so than by any formal mechanisms of accountability vis-à-vis government and/or parliament, central banks are judged by their actions. Kohn observes in this context that ". . . integrated financial markets can exert powerful feedback, which may be less forgiving of any perceived policy error". 61 The author highlights this point with reference to the FED: "For example, if financial market participants thought that the FOMC was not dedicated to maintaining long-run price stability-a notion that I can assure you is not correct-they would be less willing to hold dollar-denominated assets, and the resulting decline in the dollar would tend to add to inflationary pressures." 62 While there are currently no concrete plans in this direction, the global financial openness and the risks of spill-over and domino effects linked thereto does raises the question whether new, reinforced forms of transnational economic and monetary governance are required. 63 This has accumulated in calls for the establishment of a global monetary authority. 64 Such far-reaching proposals may be a long way off, to say the least. Yet the above mentioned trend towards the regional pooling of monetary policy could, if continued, facilitate the rebirth of a global exchange rate mechanism to facilitate stability.
By pooling monetary policy as in the case of the ESCB and the ECB, an additional challenge arise if the transfer of competences with regard to monetary policy is not accompanied by a transfer of equal competences for the conduct of a common economic policy. In the EU economic policies remain to a large extent a domain of the Member States. This poses special challenges for the ECB in formulating and implementing monetary policy in the euro area. From the start it could be observed that economic developments of the euro area Member States were anything but homogenous, raising the question whether the EU or at least the euro area actually constitutes an optimal currency area. 65 While the success of monetary policy in such an asymmetric system of economic governance depends not in the least on strong legal mechanisms to ensure fiscal discipline of the participating Member States, the near de facto insolvency of the euro area Member State Greece highlights the severe shortcomings of the present system of economic coordination in the EU and the danger this poses for a unified monetary policy.
The Global Economic Crisis
The global financial crisis has highlighted the consequences and knock-on effects that the collapse of large financial institutions can have not only on the financial system but also on the real economy. While central banks arguably played a role both in the making of and dealing with this crisis of global proportions, it is arguably the former which has attracted the attention of legislators and policy makers the most, resulting in the re-assessment of the role of central banks.
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In analysing the causes of the global financial crisis the European Commission mandated 2009 Larosière Report identifies several causes including inter alia: the illusion that permanent and sustainable high level of growth are sustainable; fundamental failures in the evaluation of risk and the role that Credit Rating Agencies play with regard to the assessment of credit risk; a failure of corporate governance; a failure of the regulatory and supervisory system as well as of the crisis management. 67 In this context also the role of central bank has been criticised for having contributed to 'benign macroeconomic conditions' through low interest rates which, combined with low inflation rates have resulted in a rapid growth of the volume of credit. Namely the role of the Fed has been questioned for its omission to tighten its monetary policy stands, thereby meeting excess liquidity namely in the shape of rapidly rising asset prices. In the view of experts this has contributed to the housing bubble that is linked to the subprime mortgage crisis. 68 The credibility of central banks has suffered as a result of this. Indeed, central banks have been diagnosed with a "doctrinal blindness", 69 and the rationale of the focus in many central bank systems on price stability is questioned. The objectives of central banks are considered to be insufficiently geared towards detecting and addressing system risks. 70 To be sure, the primarily economic debate on the contribution of central banks to the global financial crisis is far from conclusive. Nevertheless it seems appropriate to raise the issue of possible legal consequences for the future position and tasks of central banks and namely, whether and to what extent the monetary policy objective should be geared towards or include aims other than price stability, and to what extent central banks should play a more active role in (macro-) prudential supervision. However, objections are the feasibility of assigning a system stability objective to central banks and the effects which the taking on of supervisory tasks may have on the independence of monetary policy (operations).
Including a system stability objective in the legal basis of a central bank raises the question exactly what the position of such an additional mandate should be next to the existing primary objective currently found in many central bank laws. Should it be given priority, placed on an equal footing with price stability or come as a secondary objective? As has been observed above multiple central bank objectives may not only be problematic from the point of view of accountability, but come at the expanse of the effective conduct of any price stability objective. The latter of course assumes the existence of a trade-off between price stability and a system stability objective. This is however far from undisputed. Calling for the inclusion of an explicit system stability objective also suggested that the price stability objective is not sufficient in this regard. However, Issing has argued that ". . . if the central bank employs a medium term horizon for the definition of price stability and implies a strategy encompassing a stability-oriented, forward-looking approach, financial imbalances will implicitly obtain the attention they deserve. This is true even if financial stability is not considered a general objective of the central bank and monetary policy aims at maintaining the objective of price stability. [. . .] In most cases price stability would foster financial stability". 75 Supporting this view past research suggests that ". . . price level instability also contributed to financial instability historically". 76 Yet other factors also contribute to financial stability. 77 In fact it has been acknowledged that ". . . financial imbalances can build up even in an environment of stable prices" 78 Moreover, even if a system stability objective is provided for, given the nature of the subject-matter, this could hardly amount to a precise or even quantified objective. This is highlighted by the objectives in the legal bases of existing regulatory and supervisory agencies outside central banks, where general references to preserving the stability of the financial system or to maintaining market stability and at times even multiple objectives linked to financial stability can be found. 79 Judging a central bank's performance based on such broad objectives is difficult beyond generally noting the absence of financial instability and/or insolvent financial institutions.
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What is more, calls for a greater role in monitoring system stability imply that central banks can actually effectively detect systemic risks and act upon them with the instruments currently at their disposal. In defence of placing these tasks with the central bank it can be argued that ". . . synergies can be achieved by combining information gained from prudential supervision and from the conduct of monetary policy, the overall responsibility of the central bank for the stability of the system as a whole and the independence position of central banks and technical expertise existing therein, are all arguments in favour of vesting this task in the central bank."
81 Applying a similar economy-of-scale argument the Larosière Report emphasizes that ". . . the role of central banks which are by essence well placed to observe the first signs of vulnerability of a bank is of crucial importance."
82 As concerns the ability of a central bank to fulfill such a task, Issing notes that "The uncertainty related to the identification of an asset price bubble is not fundamentally different from the uncertainty surrounding other variables, in which the central bank bases its policy decisions."
83 At the same time, against the background of the housing bubble both Issing, as well as Posen question the ability of central banks to effectively intervene once systemic risks have actually been detected. Posen observes that the tightening of monetary policy in response to such developments "in no way substitutes for directly dealing with the underlying financial problems" while at the same time producing costs for the real economy. monetary policy may not provide the necessary instruments to intervene, this is not to say that central banks are per se unsuitable for the job. In this regard much depends on the legal arrangements governing micro-prudential supervision and, to the extent that this task is placed (partially) outside the central bank, on the extent to which the central bank cooperates with the competent financial regulatory and (other) supervisory authorities. In case of a separation of tasks the role of the central bank may be primarily that of monitoring and informing/advising the competent agencies on systemic risks and how to address them.
Assigning prudential supervisory tasks to a central bank may not be entirely unproblematic. Indeed, monetary policy and prudential supervision are somewhat uneasy bedfellows. 85 While it may be argued that as a lender of last resort central banks should in principle be in a perfect position to monitor financial stability and to judge whether financial institutions are actual insolvent or simply in need of liquidity, Di Noia and Di Giorgio with reference to work by Goodhart and Schoenmaker conclude that: ". . . this argument does not hold, in the sense that the 'revealed preferences' of monetary authorities have been to 'rescue banks running into difficulties so long as there appeared to be any risk of a systemic knock-on effect'".
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Assigning multiple tasks to the central bank can give rise to perverse incentives on parts of the central bank that may be tempted to (ab-) use monetary policy as a tool to fulfil its role as supervisor, resulting in biased policy decisions.
87 Supporting this view, empirical evidence points to a positive correlation between the placement of all banking supervisory tasks at the central banks and the rate and volatility of inflation in countries. 88 However, one should be careful not to conclude from this that central banks should not at all be involved in prudential supervision. In fact what is missing in debates on this topic is a clear differentiation between macroand micro-prudential supervisory tasks and thus, the task of ensuring the stability of the financial system as a whole and the task of ensuring the safety of the banking system (banking supervision). Indeed, the concerns about possible conflicts of interests may be primarily linked to the latter function. It is at least not evident why reinforced rules on the monitoring of financial stability and, where necessary, a formal obligation to informing and advice competent regulatory and supervisory agencies would be a major problem in this regard. Understood in such away, macroprudential supervision does not have to be at odds with the independent position of a central bank or its primary monetary policy objective. Anything beyond such a role however can create conflicts of interest and, in the case of a bad handling of a crisis moreover result in reputational damage with effects also for monetary policy. The vesting of extensive supervisory or even regulatory powers would also result in a further accumulation of powers in what is already a major independent policy maker -in many instances -effectively remote from the constitutional system of checks and balances.
The integrated financial systems call for a global assessment of their stability. Yet, any one central bank system arguably cannot make this assessment without proper information. Thus, cooperation between central banks takes place through an array of formal and informal international networks. 89 This cooperation takes place inter alia through the Financial Stability Board, 90 the before mentioned Central Bank Governance Forum 91 and the Central Bank Governance Network.
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This also extents to global financial markets and to micro-prudential supervision. The coordination and exchange of information is just as important as the establishment of global standards and best practice. Once again the EU can serve as an example for system providing for a such coordination, albeit being far from ideal in this regard. The role of the ECB in prudential supervision as described in the TFEU and the Protocol on the ESCB and on the ECB is essentially limited to that of an advisor to the Council, the European Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial system as a whole. 93 Financial market supervision is Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, 1997, pp. 339-343, 353. In this context Smits criticises the fact that the Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United effectively in the hands of the national competent authorities of the Member States which in some, but certainly not all instances are the national central bank. Under the current EU Lamfalussy framework no centralization, but rather a coordination of supervisory tasks, namely through the Level 2 and Level 3 committees takes place. The difficulties of coordinating supervisory efforts in such a decentralised system have been extensively discussed in the relevant literature. 94 The absence of a prudential supervision task of the ECB may be historically explained by the reluctance of national governments (and indeed their central banks) to vest also supervisory tasks upon a supranational independent monetary policy authority, resulting not only in an accumulation of power, but also a further loss of tasks for national central banks to perform. 95 This may also explain why the enabling clause of ex Art. 105(6) EC which allowed for the transfer to the ECB of specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions and other financial firms excluding insurance undertakings has never been activated. In fact the provision has been left unchanged by the Treaty of Lisbon which does not vest any new supervisory powers in the ECB. 96 In the wake of the global financial crisis the European Commission has revisited the existing Union framework and made concrete proposals to reinforce financial supervision. 97 The several legislative proposals address both macro-as well as micro-prudential supervision of the financial markets. From the outset it is noteworthy that none of these proposals aim at outright placing macro-or microprudential supervision at the ECB. Instead, on the micro-prudential side the European Commission proposes the establishment of a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), consisting of a network of national financial supervisors working in cooperation with three new regulatory agencies, including a European Banking Authority, a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and a European Securities and Markets Authority. 98 While placed outside the ECB, close institutional links primarily with the future European Banking Authority are foreseen through the participation, albeit in a non-voting capacity, of an ECB representative.
As far as macro-prudential supervision is concerned the European Commission has proposed the establishment of a European System Risk Board (ESRB). 99 The ESRB would be established as an EU regulatory agency and thus be formally placed outside the ECB. Nevertheless, the envisaged composition of the main decision-making body highlights the close link to the ECB, the national central banks and the national supervisory authorities all of which would make up the majority of the members of the General Board of the ESRB. 100 Moreover, it is planned to situate the secretariat of the ESRB at the seat of the ECB, so that synergies can emerge between these two bodies. The ESRB would be responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system ". . . in order to prevent or mitigate systemic risks within the financial system, so as to avoid episodes of widespread financial distress, contribute to a smooth functioning of the Internal Market and ensure a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth."
101 For this purpose the ESRB would not only be charged with identifying and prioritizing such risks, but in the case of the emergence of significant risks to issue warnings and even recommendations for remedial action.
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Addressee of these warnings and recommendations could be the EU as a whole, the proposed European regulatory agencies, Member States or national supervisory authorities. 103 Moreover, it is foreseen that the ESRB cooperates with international institutions such as the IMF. All in all, namely the initiative to establish an ESRB highlights the recognition in the EU of the need for more effective mechanisms to prevent the emergence of a global financial crisis of the proportions which can currently be witnessed.
Concluding Remarks
Ever since their emergence as sole issuer of currency, the role of central banks has constantly evolved accommodating both for the development of (international) trade and the understanding of the fundamentals of the economy. With the emergence of regional economic cooperation namely in the second half of the twentieth century and the gradual opening of domestic markets which increasingly has turned into a global phenomenon, more than ever before in their history central banks find themselves influenced by global trends and developments both in their institutional set-up and their main monetary policy task.
More so than national regulators and policy makers the institutional characteristics and main monetary policy objectives are decided by global financial markets on whose trust central banks rely. This is facilitated by the drafting by international standard setting organisations, such as the IMF, of guidelines and codes of best practice. The lattor has resulted in a de facto synchronization of the main institutional features and monetary tasks. Yet, in particular the unisono focus on price stability has been criticised in the aftermath of the global financial crisis for having contributed to a general failure by central banks to detect system risks.
In pursuing monetary policy in a global environment central banks may in fact be much less independent in the conduct of monetary policy than their statutory legal bases and -at times -regulators and policy makers suggest. This is not only true but certainly also true in times of global financial crisis. Next to government interventions, central banks have played a major role in adding liquidity to the financial market and by guaranteeing (government) debts.
104 Central banks could be seen relaxing their monetary policies stands, whereby in some instances conventional monetary policy reached its outer limits. Roberts predicts that as a result of the role of central banks in the financial crisis ". . . it seems probable that skepticism about technocratic governance and about the trustworthiness of markets will encourage the reassertion of political influence in policy domains that were, in the heyday of liberalization, the preserve of technocrat-guardians."
105 Translated to the position of central banks this suggests that public and eventually political pressure may grow to revisit the position of monetary policy authorities outside government. However, it is unclear in exactly what ways the involvement of elected politicians and government officials under the direct influence of the former would be an improvement upon the current situation or would have prevented the crisis. As far as monetary policy is concerned, in the absence of any evidence suggesting that the theoretical and empirical foundation of the current institutional arrangements, i.e. the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation and inflation variability, is obsolete changing the institutional position of central banks would simply increase political influence without any major benefits.
All the same time, the financial crisis should be seen as an opportunity to seriously re-evaluate the role of central banks as monetary policy authorities in a global economy. In doing so it should be taken into consideration that, a simple proliferation of central bank tasks does not necessarily make their role any more effective or indeed straightforward.
